




Why Germany matters for Japan
Hans Kundnani
Since the euro crisis began in 2010, there has been much debate 
about German power in Europe. Germany has been widely seen as a 
kind of European “hegemon.” But this both exaggerates the extent 
of German power in Europe and underplays how problematic it is. 
Rather, Germany has reverted to the position of “semi-hegemony” 
within Europe that it occupied between 1871 and 1945.1 However, 
whereas the classical “German question” was geopolitical, the new 
version of the “German question” is geo-economic – that is, German 
power is now economic rather than military. These questions around 
German power are extremely important for the future of Europe. But 
why should anyone in Japan be interested in them?
In this policy brief, I argue that there are three reasons why 
Germany matters for Japan. First, Germany and Japan have followed 
parallel historical trajectories from the second half of the nineteenth 
century to the post-Cold War period. Second, China and Germany 
have developed an increasingly close relationship in the last decade 
that has implications for the ability of Germany and the European 
Union to take a stand against China’s aggressive actions in Asia. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, there are also striking parallels 
between the rise of Germany at the end of the nineteenth century 
and beginning of the twentieth century and the rise of China now.
Parallel historical trajectories
The first reason Germany should be of interest to Japan has to do 
with the parallel historical trajectories that the two countries have 
followed going back to their simultaneous rapid rise in the second 
half of the nineteenth century – the Kaiserrreich in Germany and the 
Meiji Restoration in Japan. In fact, Germany was in many ways the 
model for Japan’s modernization – in particular, Meiji Japan borrowed 
to a large extent from Wilhelmine Germany’s constitutional and legal 
system. Both countries had a strong militarist tradition that became 
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dominant in the 1930s, when they expanded in 
their respective regions and ultimately joined 
forces against the Allies in World War II.
If anything, the parallels between Germany 
and Japan became even more striking after the 
defeat of the two countries in World War II. 
Remade into democracies with their security 
guaranteed by the United States, Japan and 
West Germany renounced the use of military 
force and became “civilian powers” – that 
is, “a new type of international power” that 
used multilateral institutions and economic 
cooperation to “civilize” international relations.2 
In both countries, a strong pacifist tendency 
emerged in response to the earlier tradition of 
militarism.
After the end of the Cold War, however, 
Germany and Japan came under pressure to 
make a greater contribution to international 
security and in particular to increase defence 
spending. In parallel, they started to contribute 
to United Nations peacekeeping operations 
in the 1990s. In this context, the concept of 
“normality” became central to foreign policy 
debates in both countries. In Germany, there 
was much debate about whether Germany 
could and should become a “normal” country 
that used military force like France or the UK.3 
Similarly, since the early 1990s, there has been 
a debate about whether Japan can, or should, 
become a “normal country.”4
Germany has gone slightly fur ther than 
Japan in changing its approach to the use of 
military force. Constitutional constraints on the 
deployment of the Bundeswehr, the German 
2　Hanns W. Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers”, Foreign Affairs, Winter 1990/91.
3　See Hans Kundnani, “The Concept of ‘Normality’ in German Foreign Policy since Unification,” German Politics and 
Society, Volume 30, Issue 2, Summer 2012, pp. 38–58. 
4　See Yoshihide Soeya, Masayuki Tadokoro and David A. Welch (eds.), Japan as a ‘Normal Country’? A Nation in 
Search of Its Place in the World (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2011).
5　According to World Bank figures, Germany spent 1.2 percent of GDP on defence in 2018 while Japan spent 0.9 
percent. See World Bank, Military expenditure (% of GDP), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS.
6　Hans Kundnani, “Germany as a geo-economic power,” Washington Quarterly, Summer 2011, pp. 31-45.
military, were effectively removed in 1994, when 
the Constitutional Court ruled that German 
troops could be deployed anywhere around 
the world and in any capacity as long as the 
deployment was approved by the Bundestag, 
the German parliament. In contrast, the use 
of Japan’s Self Defense Forces still remains 
tightly constrained and limited to peacekeeping 
operations. Germany also spends more on 
defence as a proportion of GDP than Japan, 
though Japanese defence spending is rising 
quickly.5 But during the last decade, opposition 
to the use of militar y force has once again 
hardened – particularly after Germany suffered 
casualties in Afghanistan.
More significant than these dif ferences 
on the use of militar y force, however, are 
other ways in which Germany and Japan have 
diverged during the last decade. Though 
Germany remains committed to being a 
Friedensmacht, or “force for peace,” its “civilian 
power” identity has nevertheless weakened as it 
has pursued a more realist approach to foreign 
policy. In particular, it has become increasingly 
assertive in its use of economic power – above 
all within the eurozone. Since the euro crisis 
began, Germany has used tough conditionality 
to impose its preferences on other European 
countries and even to remake their economies 
in its own image. Thus whereas Japan has 
remained a “civilian power,” I have argued that 
Germany should now be thought of instead as a 
“geo-economic power.”6
One might also argue that Japan’s policy 
on arms exports strengthens its claim still to 







Throughout the post-war period, the Federal 
Republic exported weapons – a kind of blind 
spot in its “civilian power” identity. In the case 
of Japan, on the other hand, the renunciation of 
the use of military force also extended to arms 
sales: since 1967, the government has in effect 
banned itself from selling weapons. Admittedly, 
Japan is now changing this policy so it can take 
part in joint development military technology 
projects with its allies as part of its commitment 
to “collective self-defence.” But it is hard to 
imagine that Japan will ever export weapons on 
the scale of Germany, which is now one of the 
world’s largest exporters of weapons.
The relationship between China and 
Germany
During the last decade, Germany has also 
developed an increasingly close economic and 
political relationship with China – the second 
reason why Japan should be interested in 
Germany. The basis for this relationship was 
the exponential growth of German exports, in 
particular automobiles and machinery, to China. 
This economic symbiosis led to an increasingly 
c lose  po l i t i ca l  r e la t ionship ,  which  was 
institutionalized in 2011 in the form of bi-annual 
government-to-government consultations – in 
effect, joint cabinet meetings. In part because 
of its perception of German dominance within 
the EU, China increasingly saw Germany as its 
preferred interlocutor in Europe. “If you want 
something done in Brussels you go to Berlin,” a 
Chinese official told me in 2012.7
 In the last few years, Germans have become 
7　Author interview, Beijing, 2012.
8　See Hans Kundnani, “Germany’s New Skepticism About China,” German Marshall Fund, 24 October 2016, http://
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10 Noah Barkin, “Is Germany Going Soft on China?,” Atlantic Council, 31 August 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
blogs/new-atlanticist/is-germany-going-soft-on-china/ ; Noah Barkin, “A Vulnerable Germany Finds it Hard to Say No to 
China,” Berlin Policy Journal, 9 September 2019, https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/a-vulnerable-germany-finds-it-hard-to-
say-no-to-china/.
somewhat more sceptical about China – in 
particular as it began to acquire the Mittelstand 
companies that form the backbone of German 
manufacturing.8 Against this background, it 
seemed that Germany was becoming more 
willing to support a tougher European approach 
to China. In par ticular, Germany seemed 
to be embracing a more asser tive approach 
to economic policy questions based on the 
principle of “reciprocity”. This led to a European 
Commission report published in March 2019 
which said that “there is a growing appreciation 
in Europe that the balance of challenges and 
opportunities presented by China has shifted” 
and declared that China was a “systemic rival.”9
Nevertheless, Germany’s economy remains 
extremely dependent on China as a source of 
demand for its exports – especially as demand 
from within Europe remains low, itself a 
consequence of the austerity Germany has 
imposed, and as the United States threatens 
tarif fs on German products. Big German 
companies like BASF, Siemens and Volkswagen, 
which exert a large influence on policy towards 
China, are particularly dependent on China. 
In recent months, as a recession looms in 
Germany and fears about the consequences of 
the trade war with the United States increase, 
those companies have exerted pressure on the 
chancellery and Germany has been perceived as 
reversing its shift towards a tougher approach 
and “going soft” on China.10
The close relationship between China 
and Germany should be of concern to Japan 





– and, by extension, the European Union – 
from taking a stand against China’s aggressive 
actions in Asia. In recent years, Japan has 
intensified security co-operation with France 
and the United Kingdom, including regular 
2+2 meetings of foreign and defence ministers, 
acquisition and cross-ser vicing agreements, 
and joint defence technology projects. But 
Japan has not so far been able to develop similar 
links with Germany. Of course, Germany has 
fewer military capabilities to offer than France 
or the UK – particularly naval capabilities. But 
Germany’s inactivity also reflects its reluctance 
to antagonize China.
Moreover, while the EU as a whole may be 
shifting towards a tougher approach to protect 
its own companies, German reluctance also 
holds it back from playing a more active role 
in Asian security. In 2016, for example, French 
Defence Minister Yves Le Drian proposed that 
European navies coordinate a “regular and 
visible” presence in maritime areas of Asia in 
order to uphold the international rule of law.11 
But though Germany is rhetorically committed 
to the international rule of law, it is reluctant 
to take such steps to uphold it. As a result, the 
French proposal has gone nowhere. While 
France and the UK have since then carried out 
presence operations in the South China Sea on 
their own, this has not coalesced into a more 
coherent joint European approach.
Germany’s economic dependence could 
also make it reluctant to take other steps like 
economic sanctions in the event of a crisis 
provoked by aggressive Chinese actions in Asia. 
After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Germany 
was initially hesitant to impose sanctions on 
Russia – in par t because of opposition from 
German business. Shortly after the annexation, 
11  Yves Le Drian, speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, 5 June 2016.
12 See Hans Kundnani, The nightmare for German business: an “Asian Crimea,” European Council on Foreign Relations, 
2 June 2014, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_nightmare_for_german_business_an_asian_crimea267.
13 Aaron Friedberg, “Will Europe’s Past Be Asia’s Future?” Survival, vol. 42, no. 3, Autumn 2000, pp. 147–59.
14 Edward Luttwak, The Rise of China vs. The Logic of Strategy (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2012), chapter 7.
Siemens chief executive Joe Kaeser met 
President Vladimir Putin in Moscow and said 
that his company had done business in Russia 
for 160 years and would not allow “short-term 
turbulence” to affect it. While German business 
eventually supported the imposition of sanctions 
on Russia, it is much harder to imagine that 
it would do so in response to a kind of “Asian 
Crimea” scenario.12 Interestingly, Kaeser is now 
the chairman of the Asia-Pacific Committee for 
German Business and plays an influential role in 
German China policy.
Germany’s past, China’s future?
Meanwhile, as China rises, parallels with 
Germany’s past  have also become more 
striking – the third and perhaps ultimately most 
important reason why people in Japan should be 
interested in Germany. In 2000 Aaron Friedberg 
of Princeton University wrote an influential 
essay called “Will Europe’s Past Be Asia’s 
Future?” in which he argued that great-power 
rivalry in Asia in the twenty-first century could 
resemble that in Europe in the late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century.13 Since 
then, there has been an ongoing debate among 
academics and analysts about the relevance 
to Asian security of the European history that 
culminated – catastrophically – in World War I.
Within this overall comparison between 
Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries and Asia now, some see particular 
similarities between the role played by Germany 
then and China now – what the American 
strategist Edward Luttwak (also a key figure 
in debates about “geo-economics”) called the 
“inevitable analogy.”14 As Charles Krauthammer 
put it: “Modern China is the Germany of a 







power seeking its place in the sun.”15 This may 
be too blunt. But if in general Asia’s future 
resembles Europe’s past in some ways, China’s 
future may specifically resemble Germany’s 
past.
The basis of the “inevitable analogy” is 
geopolitics, which seem to have created a 
dynamic that is remarkably similar to the one 
in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Like Germany at the time of its rise, China 
“has the seas but not the ocean,” as Gong Li, 
formerly deputy director of the Institute of 
International Strategy at the Central Par ty 
School in Beijing, puts it. In order to access the 
ocean, which it needs to as a rising power with 
a growing demand for resources, it must face 
the pre-eminent naval power of the day – just 
as Germany did. China is developing its naval 
capabilities and challenging the United States 
much as Germany’s development of its navy 
under Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz challenged the 
United Kingdom at the end of the nineteenth 
century.
Against the background of these geopolitical 
similarities, foreign policy debates in China 
today echo those in Wilhelmine Germany. In 
particular, Chinese strategists today are divided 
about whether to focus on the projection of 
power by land or by sea much like German 
strategists at the end of the nineteenth and 
beginning of the twentieth centur y were.16 
“Navalist” strategists such as Admiral Yang Yi 
argue that sea power is essential for China’s 
15 Charles Krauthammer, “Why President Obama is right about India,” Washington Post, 12 November 2010, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/11/AR2010111106072.html. The reference to a “place 
in the sun” is to a famous statement by the German chancellor Bernhard von Bülow in 1897: “We do not want to 
put anyone in our shadow, but we also demand our place in the sun.” See http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/
eng/607_Buelow_Place%20in%20the%20Sun_111.pdf.
16 See Geoff Eley, “Empire by Land or Sea? Germany’s Imperial Imaginary, 1840–1945,” in Bradley Naranch and Geoff 
Eley (eds.), German Colonialism in a Global Age (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2014).
17 See Yun Sun, “March West: China’s Response to the U.S. Rebalancing,” Brookings Institution, 31 January 2013, 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/01/31/march-west-chinas-response-to-the-u-s-rebalancing/.
18 James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “History Rhymes: The German Precedent for Chinese Seapower,” Orbis, 
Volume 54, Issue 1, 2010, pp. 14-34.
rise. But others such as Wang Jisi have argued 
that China should “rebalance” its foreign policy 
by focusing on the area from Central Asia to 
the Middle East – in other words, land power. 
Precisely because the expansion of its naval 
capabilities is increasing tensions with the 
United States, China should “march west” – in 
other words, “pivot” to the area from which the 
United States is perceived to be “retreating” – 
and thus avoid the mistakes Germany made in 
its naval arms race with Britain.17
Thus China faces a similar dilemma as it rises 
as Germany did in the early twentieth century 
– albeit in a very different world. With this in 
mind, James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara of 
the United States Naval War College compared 
in detail the rise of Chinese sea power today 
to the rise of German sea power a centur y 
ago.18 They concluded that today’s China not 
only has important strategic advantages over 
Wilhelmine Germany, but, aware of Germany’s 
past, has also taken a smarter, more low-profile 
approach as it rises than Germany did: “studied 
understatement” instead of “reckless posturing.” 
Whereas Germany built massive ships to rival 
Britain’s dreadnoughts, China has focused 
instead on developing asymmetrical capabilities. 
In short, Beijing may be better placed to fulfil its 
naval aspirations than Berlin was a century ago.
Meanwhile, China’s attempts to project power 
by land also resemble those of Wilhelmine 
Germany. In particular, the Silk Road Economic 





and Road Initiative, which will run from China 
through Central Asia to Europe – is reminiscent 
of Germany’s approach at the beginning 
of the twentieth centur y. As an element of 
its Weltpolitik, or “world policy”, Germany 
planned to build a railway linking Berlin with 
Constantinople and Mesopotamia, which would 
allow it to bypass British-controlled sea lanes 
and displace British influence in the Middle 
East. The Berlin-Baghdad railway, which was 
never completed, was even seen by some as a 
new “Silk Road” – itself a term that had been 
coined by a German, Ferdinand von Richthofen, 
just over a decade before.
Conclusion
Thus whereas the “German question” is now 
“geo-economic” rather than geopolitical, the 
“Chinese question” looks a lot like the classical 
– that is, the pre-1945 – version of the “German 
question.” Germany and Japan rose at around 
the same time and followed strikingly similar 
historical trajectories from the second half of 
the nineteenth century to the immediate post-
Cold War period. But the parallels between a 
rising China and a rising Germany – though 
separated by over a century – now look even 
more compelling. As Japan struggles to deal 
with China’s rise and its implications for Asia, 
an understanding of Wilhelmine Germany may 
help. In other words, in the end, Germany’s past 
may be even more important for Japan than its 
present.
